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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
/ 
The past tew years have witnessed a notable Increase in 
investigation of the cognitive processes - the means whereb,. 
organiams achieve, retain, and transform information. The 
work ot Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin (1956) represented a 
renewed effort to deal with one ot the simplest and. most 
ubiquitous phenomena of cognition: categorl,ing or conceptualiz-
ing, The spirit of their inquiry was descriptive. The,. sought 
to describe and in a small measure to explain what happens when 
an intelligent human being seeks to sort the environment into 
signifioant classe. of events so that he may end by treating 
discriminably ditferent things as equivalents. 
The basis for inferring membership in a class for a 
particular object depend.s on the attributes of the object. 
The attributes, therefore, serve as signals which tell us the 
category of the object. An attribute is any discriminable 
feature of an event that is susceptible of some discriminable 
variation from event to event. When we say that any attribute 
may vary, we imply that any attribute represents a dimenslon 
along which one may specif,. values. The attribute of' color may be 
represented by the values red, Violet, blue, green, "Etc." 
There are continuous gradations along it. Other attributes, 
those that var,. discretely, bave no such continuity. The 
simplest discrete attribute dimension is a binary on, and this 
t7Pe is very common. A woman is married or not married, she is 
dead or alive, "Etc." 
A range of values ma,. also serve to detine the exemplars at 
a category. For example, one ot the defining attributes ot the 
fruit orange is color. The positive value of the attribute is a 
range of colors trom orange-,-ellow through red-orange. There are 
man,. discriminable hues that are "acceptable" as signals that 
the round object betore one is an orange and is thus discriminable 
from other classes of things as lemons and grapefruits. The 
width of the range of positive values of an attribute that an 
individual will accept as a basis tor categorization will vary 
from object to object. 
Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin distinguished between three 
category t7Pes: conjunctive, disjunctive, and relational. They 
said that it was not usual to inter identity or some other 
significate from a single attribute exhibited by an instance, 
but trom several attributes taken together. Illness, for example, 
is not inferred only from abnormal body temperature, but from a 
whole set of clinical signs taken in combination. Attributes or 
cues are oombined for making inferences. The principal distinot-
ions, conjunctive, disjunctive, and relational, each involve a 
d1fferent mode of combining attributes. 
A conjunctive oategory or concept is one defined by the 
joint presenoe of the appropriate value of several attributes. 
A disjunctive category is one defined by the presence of one 
attribute or as well by another attribute. A relatiQnalconoept 
/ 
or oategory is one defined by a speoifiable relationship between 
defining attributes. It is sometimes possible to describe the 
same grouping or olass of instanoes in terms of two different 
combinations of attributes. One way of combining attributes may 
prove to be equivalent to another in terms of the groupin8s 
that result by use or application, i.e., it may turn out that one 
rule for combining attributes may prove to be equivalent to 
another. 
Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin stressed the "invented" or 
"oonstructed" nature of a concept or category. The type of 
concept a person construots out of the positive instances of the 
oategory he has met will determine the way in which he will 
categorize new instances encountered. When one learns to categor-
ize a subset of events in a certain way, one is doing more than 
simply learning to recognize positive instances encountered. One 
is also learning a rule that may be applied to new instances. 
The ooncept or category is basically the "rule of grouping" and 
it is such rules that one constructs in forming and attaining 
concepts. In this sense, conjunotive, disjunctive, and relational 
categories are different types of rules for grouping a set of 
attribute values for defining the positive or exemplifying 
instances of a concept. 
Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin suggested that disjunctive 
conoepts were more diffioult to learn or Identlfy than conjunot-
Ive, although a dlrect comparlson of the two types was not made. 
The first systematic investigatlon of posslble difterences In rule 
/ 
difflcul ty was reported by Hunt and Hovland (1960). These re-
searchers studied which of three different rules a subject would 
choose it all were consistent with a partlcular grouping of 
stimuli. Two of the rules were conjunction (ftand") and disjunct-
ion ("and/or"). The thlrd, Galled the relatlonal rule, specifies 
a certain relationship such as "greater than" or "equal to," 
between specific stimulus attributes. As an example, one relat-
ional ooncept used by these experimenters was, "Same number of 
figures in the upper and lower portions ot a stimulus card." 
The subject was presented with a series of geometriC designs, 
some of which were labeled as negative. The instances were 
selected in such a way that the positive class could be described 
logically either as a conjunctive, a disjunctive, or a relational 
conoept. Which conoept, if any, the SUbject discovered while 
inspecting these stimuli, was determined in a subsequent series 
of test trials. In the test, the subject was required to pick 
out the stimuli which he thought were consistent with (were 
positive instances of) the concept illustrated by the original 
stimulus. series. Conjunctive and relational concepts were ohosen 
with greater frequenoy than disjunotive concepts but did not 
d1ffer from each other. 
Bourne (1966) interpreted frequency of choice as an 
indication of the relative difficulty ot each rule or type of 
solution. On the basis of the Hunt and Hovland data, Bourne 
inferred that relational and conjunctive concepts were easier 
than disjunctives. He also raised a few additional qyestions in 
his survey of the literature in this area,. For example, he 
asked: 1) Will the earne result hold if we look at the learning 
process directly rather than require the subject to recognize 
positive instanoes after learning presumably has been completed? 
2) If the result does hold up under various procedural cOfiditions, 
what are the significant contributing factors? 3) Given that 
differences in difficulty among rules do exist, are they in any 
way affected by practice? 
Conant and Trabasso (1964) and Neisser and Weene (1962) 
reported evidence related to the first two of these questions. 
In the Conant-Trabasso experiment, the subjects were required to 
discover the solution to structurally equivalent conjunctive and 
disjunctive problems under a seleetion paradigm. All subjects 
solved problems of both types, 'presented in oounterbalanced 
order. Consistent with the conclusion of Hunt and Hovland, 
disjunctive concepts were reliably more difficult to solve than 
conjunctive. These researchers were able further to trace at 
least part of the difference between rules to the relative 
diffioulty of negative and positive instances. In terms of 
logioal information, negative instances were more valuable than 
positive when the solution was a disjunction while just the 
reverse was true tor conjunctive problems. Conant and Trabasso 
showed that subjects learned more readi17 to use the information 
available in positive instances, thus putting them at somewhat 
of a disadvantage in disjunctive problems. From the earlier 
results of Freibergs and Tulving (1961), however, di~ferences 
between conjunctive and disjunctive problems would be expected 
to lessen or disappear with extensive practice in the use of 
negative information. One additional finding in this experiment 
was that subjectA' card selections were more redundant 
(provided overlapping information) in d.1sjunctive problems. 
This also may be due to the difficulty subjects had in under-
standing the full implications of a negative instance. Because 
the information they contained was diffioult to assimilate and 
utilize, several stimuli providing essentially the same 
information may be required by the subject. 
The study reported by Neisser and Weene (1962) was 
distinguished by its use of a large variety ot different rules 
for forming concepts. These experimenters showed that there 
were ten different rules tor generating nominal concepts based 
on (at most) two relevant attributes. Further, they indicated 
that these rules tell into three structurally difterent levels 
of complexity. On Level I are two rules: affirmation - all 
stimuli with attribute x are members of the concept; and 
negation - all stimuli which do not display attribute x are 
members of the concept. On the next higher level (II) were a 
set ot rules which specified either a oonjunctive or disjunctive 
oombination of two attributes; for example, ftx and y" or 
"not x and/or y." Finally, on Level III are oombinations ot two 
attributes which involve both conjunctive and disjunctive rules; 
for example, "(x and y) and/or (not x and not y)." Successive 
levels represented increasing conceptual (or rule) complexity 
both in terms of the length of expression and in terms of 
hierarchical structure. Concepts at each level were composed of 
concepts from the next lower level. Neisser and Weene explored 
the learning of concepts at each level on the assumption that 
problem difficulty would increase with the structural complexity 
of a concept. 
Significant changes in difficulty were observed as the 
level of concept increased. The outcome was interpreted as 
reflecting a hierarchical organization of conceptual processes 
within the subject. To attain a complex concept, the subject 
must use, and therefore must have attained earlier, some simpler 
ooncepts from lower levels. Complex learning and problem solving 
is predicated on earlier and simpler learning processes. While 
one may question this interpretation on several grounds (there 
is no real evidence that the subjects did learn Level III 
concepts as a combination of conjunctions and disjunctions), 
the fact still remains that rule differences do exist in 
significant degree, indicating again the real function of the 
rule as an item of knowledge to be discovered and used in any 
conceptual tas7l:. 
More recently, Haygood and Bourne (1965) compared the 
performance of human subjects on four different rules: conjunct-
ion, disjunction, JOint denial (only patterns which are neither 
A nor B are positive instances of the conoept, where A and Bare 
are the relevant attributes), and conditional (if a pattern 
contains A th.en it must also containB to be a positiveinstanoe). 
There were th.ree different conditions of learning. All subjects 
were given a series of five successive problems of the same type 
so that practioe and transfer effects could be observed. For 
subjects working in the attribute identification condition, the 
required rule was explained and illustrated prior t~ the first 
problem and then desoribed again between each successive problem 
thereafter. In the rule-learning oondition, the two relevant 
attributes were naMed prior to eaoh problem. Neither the rule nor 
the attributes were specified in complete learning. For any 
subject, the same rule held for all tive problems, though the 
relevant attributesohanged rrom problem to problem. The recept-
ion paradigm was used throughout. 
Rules differed markedly in diffioulty on problem one, with 
conditional and disjunctive rules producing the greatest numbers 
of errors and trials to solution. However, these differences 
gradually diminished with suocessive problems, indicating that 
at least part of the differences among rules ma,. be a function 
of their relative familiarity. In general, performanoe was worst 
in oomplete learning oonditions. Performance approached perfeotior 
over five rule-learning problems; that is, subjects made almost 
no errors on the fifth problem for three of the rules. PerformanCE 
levels in attribute identifioation and complete learning 
oonditions were nearly the same after rive problems. The latter 
findIng suggested that the subjects did learn the rules in the 
course of training and that remaining differences among the rules 
were due to the difficulties each presented for identifying 
relevant attributes. It seems clear from this experiment that 
differences in rule difficulty arose from both sources discussed 
earlier. First, rules differ in and of themselves probably 
because subjects are more experienced with some (for example, 
conjunotive) than with others (for example, disjunctive). Second, 
rules differ because it was analytically or strategically 
easier to identify the relevant attributes for some. 
The present rosearch was focused on the conditional 
conoept. General researoh in the area shows that the conditional 
ooncept·is much more difficult than the conjunctive or disjunctiv • 
Shephard, Hovland, and Jenkins (1961) explored the learning and 
memorization of six different types of classification, each 
oontaining two oategories with an equal number of stimulus 
members. Two of the six classifications were based on the 
biconditional rule, one involving two, the other three relevan~ 
dimensions (Types II and VI respeotively). Their interest was 
mainly the effect ot the number of relevant or irrelevant 
dimensions on the learning and memorization of classifications. 
As the number of relevant dimensions increased (Type II versus 
Type VI), the number of irrelevant ones decreased. As such, their 
compar·ison provided no unambiguous information about the tormat-
ion of the conditional concept itself. 
The first study designed to examine the ettects of irrele-
vant information in non-conjunotive ooncept problems was that 
of Kepros and Bourne (1966). Using the bioonditional rule, they 
found a linear inorease in problem diffioulty as the number of 
irrelevant dimensions inoreased. Haygood and stevenson (1967) 
oompared the affects of number of irrelevant dimensions on 
oonjunotive, inolusive disjunotive, and oonditional oonoept 
formation., In their study, the bioondi tional was omitted because 
of its extreme diffioulty. A Simple oonditionalwas used instead .. 
The effeot of inoreasing irrelevant dimensions was greater as 
rule diffioulty increased with oonditional showing largest 
inorease in mean e'::'rors to solution, disjunoti va next largest, 
and the oonjunotive rule the least. 
A study performed by Laughlin and Jordan (1967) employed 
oonjunctive, disjunctive, and biconditional conoepts. J.'or the 
oriteria of number of oard ohoioes and time to solution, 
disjunotive oonoepts were signifioantly more diffioult than 
oonjunotive, but there were no differences between oonjunotive 
and bioonditional. Laughlin and JordAn traced the differenoes 
partly to the differenoes between seleotion and rooeption 
procedures; slnoe Haygood and Bourne used programrl1ed sequences, 
subjeots were more likely to draw negative instances useful for 
the solution of concept rules other than oonjunctive, than would 
be the case fo~ the selection paradigm. Also. Haygood and 
Bourne's four-attribute and three-value ooncept universe oould 
be oontrasted with Laughlin and Jordan's six-attribute and 
tU:1-value universe; bioonditional concepts could become 
relatIvely more difficult than other !;/pes as the number of 
values per attribute inoreased. 
Jacobson (1967) undertook a study to determine the relative 
diffioulty of five conceptual rules under two conditions of 
memory demands. Three problems were given to eighty Loyola 
University undergraduate stUdents. A 5 X 2 X 3 repeated measures 
factorial design was used with the variables: 1) Conoept rule 
(oonjunotive, exclusive disjunotive, exclusion, bi.".}onditional, 
and conjunottve absenoe), 2) ~1emory (paper allowed or not 
allowed), 3) Problems (three per subjeot). Five response measures 
'were used to measu~'e the relative diffioulty of oonoepts: 
a) card ohoioes to solution, b) focusing strategy, 0) soanning 
strategy, d) time to solution in minutes, and e) untenable 
hypotheses. In generH~, the results showed that conjunctive 
concepts were easiest for subjects to attain. Conjunctive 
ooncepts were attained most readily as was ref'leoted by eaoh of 
the five response measures. Bioonditional concepts were the 
most difficult to attain; the biconditional rule featured the 
most difficult solution on three response meaoures (card choices, 
scanning, and untenable hypotheses). l'he next most diff'ioul t 
solution lias e::cclusive disjunction. 'I'he easiest solution arter 
conjunctive was oonjunotive absonce. Intermediate in diffioulty 
among all the -'?'Illes was exolusion. The finding ths,t bioonditional 
and exclusive disjunotion rules represented the most difficult 
solutions was consistent vii th previous researoh in the area. 
Previous studies in conditional oonoept formation have 
either employed the biconditional or ttl: conditional concept in 
co.!lparison to other rules such as the disjunctive or conjunctive. 
lJ'he purpose of the present study is to concentrate ~Q the factors 
which go into the formation of the oonditional concept itself. 
A general selecticn paradigm, described by Bourne (1966), 
was set up. The stimQlus population was presented to the subject. 
The problem began when the experimenter designated one member of 
the population as a positive instance of the concept which must 
be discoverec .• On the basis of this information. the subject 
guessed what the correct hypothesis was; that is, he stated some 
hypothesis about the solution. If the guess was wrong. the 
subject himself was allowed to select an instance from the 
population and to ask whether it was positive or negative. Once 
this question had been answered by the experimerlter. the subject 
chose a new instance and revised his hypothesis according to the 
new information which he has received. This process continued -
another instanoe was selected by the subject and categorized by 
the experimenter - until the subjeot stated the correct hypothesls; 
that Is, the solution. In this first study of the conditional 
concept, this procedure was mod.ified slightly. The attribute 
identification learning of Haygood and Bourne (196,5) was also 
adopted. 
Since the emount of information received would be vital to 
the su":iject, this variable was made the independent veriable. 
~Juro.beI' of card choices to solution would be the criterion for 
problem solving. The more information a subject would receive, 
the easier It would beror him to sol\<.; the problem. In the 
experimental paradigm, the amount of feedbaok information was 
di vided into total and partial t'eedback. In the tota:J, fe'edbaok 
condition, the subject was told "Yes" when a positivelnstance 
of the conditIonal concept acoltl·ed. Both the "It" and the "'1'hen" 
factors were present on the oard. Fe was told "Does-not ... contra-
dict" when the "If" faotor was not present. Under this condition, 
the "Then" faotor might or might not be present on the card. Ue 
was told "l~ott when the oondi tional rule was violated: The "It" 
factor wes present on the card; the "Then" factor was absent. 
In the partial feeuback oondition, the subjeot was told "Yes" 
it' the oonditional rule was exeMplified or not contradioted. He 
was told "No" when the rule was violated. 
Besidee information on feedbaok, there is a certain amount 
of information about the correct hlPothesis giv.enwi th the 
subjeot's first oard. Either both faotors of the oonditional 
ooncept ("If" and "Then") will be present, both absent, or one 
of them will be present. If the first oard oontains both factors 
(Yes-Yea), itwlll be affYes" card in both. the total and partial 
feedbaok oondi tions. v-lhen the "rf" faotor(No",Yes) or both 
faotors (No-Me) are absent on the first oard, it will be a 
"Does-not-contradict" in the total, and a "Yes" card 1n the 
partial feedba~k conditions. 
Koeping 1n mind the two types of information, namely on 
feedback and on first card, the experimental hypotheses were as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 1. The greater the am.ount c.':;' feed:lack ini'o.rmation, 
tbe fewer the number of care choices before the subjeot solves 
the problem. 
Hypothesis 2. The gr.eater the al'lount of information on the first 
oard, the fewer the number of cclrd ohoices before the subjeot 
solves the problem. 
~lypothesig 3. An interaction effeot might take plaoe between 
amount of feedback information and amount of inforroation on 
first card. 
N.R. "Solving the problem" means discovering the proper 
oonditional oonoep~. 
CHAPTER II 
METHOD 
SUbjects: The subjects were 78 Major Seminarians trom the 
tollowing three Chicago suburban Major Seminaries: Divine Word 
Seminary, Techny, Illinois; Dominican House of Studies, River 
Forest, Illinois; Tolentine Center, Olympia Fields, Illinois. 
Apparatus: The stimulus display was a 28 X 44 inch white 
posterboard containing an 8 X 8 array of 64 21 X 4 inch cards 
drawn in oolored ink with dark outlines. The 64 cards represented 
all possible combinations ot six plus and minus signs in a row. 
Bach position had a ditferent color {e.g. first position was 
always blue}. The name of the color was the attribute, While the 
plus or minus represented the value ot each color; e.g. attribute 
red: value: minus. The cards were systematically arranged upon 
the display board. For example, the top four rows were blue plus 
and the bottom four rows were blue minus. 
Procedure: The purpose ot the different colors and signs 
on the sequence board was explained to each subject individually. 
This was done in the following way: Color was merely a position-
ing attribute which turned up in a plus or minus value on each 
card on the sequenoe board. It was possible to olassify or 
oategorize the oards according to attribute (oolor) and value 
(plus or minus). This classification or categorization could be 
set up arbitrarily. Certain of the cards on the sequence board 
would exemplify the category and certain cards would not. In 
other words, it was possible to divide the 64 cards on the 
sequence board into those which exemplified the arbitrary 
category or classification and those which would not. An example 
of this was given to the subject by defining a category with a 
single attribute and a single value. The subject was then asked 
to name the cards by number which fit the category which we had 
arbitrarily set up. It was pointed out that on a single attribute 
and value, the board was cut in half: half of the cards exemplif-
ied the category and half did not. 
The subject was then told that it was possible to define a 
category in as many as six attribute. and two value •• The 
subject was then given the possibilities of the values of the 
two attribute category to which we would limit ourselves today. 
The possible value combinations are: ++, --, +-, and -+. After 
each possibIlity was given, an example was made up and the 
subject was asked to point out by number, all the cards which 
the category. 
It was then pointed out that what had been called a 
"category" or "classification" was the same thing a8 a concept. 
Some concepts were simple. They oontained few elements. Others 
were more complex. They contained many elements. For experimen-
tal purposes, we could construct wither very simple or very 
complex concepts with the sequence board. The purpose of the 
sequence board was the study of concept fOPmation. 
The interest of the present study was in a special type of 
two attribute concept, namely, the conditional conc~pt.The 
nature of the conditional concept in terms of "If" and "Then" 
factors was explained to the subject. All the possibilities 
of the values were pointed out and demonstrated: "If" factor +, 
"Then" factor +; "If" factor ., "Then" factor-; "It" factor +, 
"Then" factor -; "11'" 1'actor ., "Then" factor +. In each case, 
the subject was given an example and asked to choose the cards 
on the sequence board by number, which exempli1'ied the conoept. 
The subject was allowed to ask questions. At this pOint, the 
subject was also asked whether he had any. All questions were 
answered at this point. 
The task was explained very brie1'ly: on a sheet of paper, 
the experimenter had a particular two attribute two value con-
ditional concept written down. The task of the subject was to 
find it. The conditional rule, typed on a small index card, was 
given to the subject. He was told to keep it and refer to it 
throughout the entire task. The conditional rule read as 1'ollows: 
"If the card'has a particular value (plus or minus) on one color, 
then it must have a particular value on another color in order 
to be included in the concept. But if it does not have the 
particular value on the 1'irst color, then it does not need to 
have the particular value on the second color. Example: 11' 
black plus, then yellow plus. (But if black minus, then either 
yellow plus or minus.)" 
The instructions differed slightly from here on for the 
partial and total feedbaok oonditions. In the partial feedback 
condition, the subject was told: "The first card is a 'Yes' card." 
In the total feedbaok condition, the subjeot was told either: 
"The first card is a tYes' card"; or: "The first card is a 
'Does-not-contradict' card." 
The exaot prooedure was then explained. The subject would 
be giyen a oard (which was a "Yes" or "Does-not-contradiot"). 
He would haye to make the choioe ot: another oard, designating 
his choice by calling out the card number. He was allowed to 
ohoose any oard on the sequence board. He would be given the 
appropriate feedback: "Yes" or "No" on the partial feedback 
condition; "Yes," "No," or "Does-not-contradict" on the total 
feedback condition. Then the subjeot would be allowed to make a 
hypothesis. If the hypothesis was correct, the problem would be 
considered solved. If it was not correot, then the subjeot would 
have to make another card choice. Then he would be given the 
appropriate feedback as after his previous oard choice. Then he 
would be allowed another hypothesis. He would be allcwed one 
hypothesis per card choice. The idea was to try to solve the 
problem in as few card choices as possible. Time was going to be 
kept, but time was not an important factor in the experiment. 
The subject was told that there were three problems. 
The following feedbs.ck information was typed on index cards 
available to the subject throughout the experiment. He was 
encouraged to refer to the oards during the oourse of his task. 
For the total feedback oondition, the information was as follows: 
"Yes: A 'Yes' answer to your oard choice means that thd card you 
have chosen fits the concept rule because it exempliries it, 
/ 
that is, the correct hypothesis is oontained on the card." 
"No: A 'No' answer ;t;o your card choice means that the card 
you have chosen contradicts the concept rule. The correct hypothe -
is 1s not contained on the card. On a 'No' card l the '1f t factor 
will be present, but not the 'Then' factor." 
"Does-not-contradict: A 'Does-not-contradict' answer to the 
card you have chosen means that the card does not fall under the 
concept rule. This would occur when the '1f t factor is not pres-
ent, although the 'Then' factor might or might not be present." 
For the partial feedback oondi t'.on, the feedbaok information 
was as follows: "Yes: A 'Yes' answer to your card choice means 
either: 1) The card fits the ooncept rule because it exemplifies 
it, that is, the correct hypothesis is contained on the oard. 
2) The card fits the oonoept rule beoause it does not contradict 
it, that is the fIf' factor is not present, although the 'Then' 
factor might or :might not be present." 
"No: A 'No' answer to your oard choice means that the card 
you have chosen contradicts the concept rule. The correct 
hypothesis is not contained on the card. On a 'No' card the 'If' 
factor will be present, but not the 'Then' faotor." 
Design: The design of the experiment was a 3 X 2 X 3 
repeated-measures factorial: 
Factor 1: Amount of Information onb'lrst Card: 
Yes-Yes: The "Xf" 8nd "Then" factors of the solution were 
on the first card. 
No-Yes: The "If" factor of the solution 'Was not on the first 
card, but the "Then n factor was. 
No-No: Neither "If" nor "Then" factors of the solution 
were on the first card. 
Factor 2: Amount of Information on Feedback: 
Total: The subject is told "Yelll," "No," or "Does-not-
contradict" after each card Choice. 
Partial: The subject is told "Yes" or "No" a.fter each card 
choice. 
Factor 3: Three Problems were given to each subjeot. 
CHAPTER III / 
RESULTS 
The data were first analyzed for the dependent variable of 
number of oard choices to solution. Although time to solution 
was not considered the basic depend~nt variable in the experiment 
it too was analyzed. Throughout the results section, the follow-
ing abbreviations are used: C ... Card Choice, F - Feedback, and 
P - Problems. 
Card Choices to Solution: Tba mean card choices to solution 
for the conditional concept are given in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Mean Number of Ca~d Choices to Solution for Three Problems and 
Totals over Problems. 
Feedback 
Partial Total 
First Card: Y-Y N-Y Y-Y N-Y N-N 
Problem: 
One: 10.9 11.3 14.2 4.1 9.1 1.3 
Two: 10.9 9.3 19.8 1.0 14.0 5.7 
Three: 13.8 1.3 13.8 4.0 1.3 1.6 
Total: 35.6 33.9 41.8 15.7 30.4 20.6 
Resu1t~ of the analysis of variance for card choioes are given in 
Table 2. 
Table 2 
/ 
/ 
Anal,.sis of Variance 'for Number ot: Card Choices to Solution. 
Source ~ Variance: ~.!. 
Card Choice (0) 2 
Feedback (F) 1 
o X F 2 
Error (B) 72 
ProbleMS (P) 2 
p X c 4 
P X F 2 
PXOXF 4 
Error (W) 144 
*£ <.01 
353.17 
1850.?8 
639.90 
17074.67 
200.33 
382.67 
70.01 
830.28 
17271.99 
M.S. 
--
176.88 
18$0.28 
319.95 
237.14 
100.16 
95.67 
35.00 
207.82 
119.94 
F 
<1 
7.80* 
1.35 
,,(1 
<1 
..::::1 
1.73 
Thus, in terms of the experimental hypotheaes, the results 
were as follows: 
Hypothesis 1r The greater the· amount of: feedback information, 
the fewer the number ot card choices betore the subject solves 
the problem. This hypothesis was verified. There was a strong 
effect of amount of feedbkck information on the number of card 
choices to solution, as total feedbaak required tewer card 
choices than partial, ! (1,72) = 7.80, ~<.Ol. 
Hypothesis 2: The greater the amount of information on the first 
oard, the fewer the number of card choices before the subject 
solves the problem. As is apparent from Table 2, the effect of 
first card information on number of card choices was not 
significant, ! (2,72) = <1. Therefore the seoond hypothesis was 
not verified. 
Hypothesis 3: An interaction effect might take place between 
amount of feedback information and amount of information on 
first card. As is apparent from Table 2 card choices, none of 
the interaotions were signifioant. Therefore this hypothesis 
was not verified. 
Time to Solution in Minutes: The mean time to solution in 
minutes is given in Table 3. Results of analysis of varianoe 
Table 3 
Mean Time to Solution in Minutes for Three Problems and Totals 
over Problems. 
First Oard: 
Problem: 
One: 
Two: 
Three: 
Total: 
Feedbaok 
Partial 
Y-Y N-Y N-Ii 
26.6 33.7 41.5 
16.) 15.0 37.4 
20.3 1).6 27.5 
65.4 62.3 106.4 
Total 
Y-Y N-Y N-N 
15.0 16.) 21.2 
14.7 16.5 15.0 
9.8 11.8 16.2 
39.5 44.6 52.4 
for time to solution are given in Table 4. As is apparent from 
Table 4 
Analysis of Varianoe for Time to Solution in Minutes. 
Souroe of Varianoe: .!!.!.. s.s. H·!· II' 
- --
-
Card Choioe (C) 2 4061.78 2030.89 3.09 
Feedbaok (F) 1 6914.46 6914.46 10.53* 
C X Ii' 2 1558.25 779.12 1.18 
Error (B) 72 47274.42 656.58 
Problems (p) 2 3460.91 1730.56 5.86** 
p X C 4 343.06 85.19 <1 
P X F 2 913.12 406.56 1.37 
p X C X II' 4 1085.34 271.33 <1 
Error (VI) 144 42520.01 295.27 
*£< .01. 
**E. -« • 01. 
Table 4, the analysis of variance for mean time to solution 
paralleled the analysis of variance for mean number of oard 
choioes. The effeot of feedbaok information was signifioant in 
te~s of less time for the total over the partial feedbaok 
information oondition, ! (1,72) = 10.53, E. ~.Ol. In te~s of 
information on first card, the differenoe between the total and 
partial feedback information oonditions for time to solution 
approaohed, but did not exoeed the oritioal value of l (3.12) 
at the .05 level of signifioanoe, ! (2,12) = 3.09. 
ditferenoe between problems in terms ot minutes per problem was 
significant at the.Ol level, ! (2,144) :: 5.86. The results of 
Duncan Multiple Range Tests showed that problem one took 
significantly more time than problem three (l? < .01), while 
problems one and two, and problems two and three, did not differ 
significantly. 
CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
The results of the experiment were quite straightforward. 
In terms of feedback information, significantly fewer card 
ohoices were required in the total than in the partial feedback 
oondition. In terms of information on the first card, however, 
there was no signifioant differenoe between the two conditions. 
e 
In other words, the subject seemed to have bentfited more by 
feedback information than by information on the first card. 
In explanation, we might further analyze exactly what kind 
of information was on the first card. In the partial feedback 
condition, the subject was not told what factors of the concept 
were on the oard. From the onset, he knew only that the first 
card was a "Yes" card. In one case, both factors of the con-
ditional concept were actually on the card. In the second case, 
the "If" factor was not present, but the "Then" factor was pres-
ent. In the third case, neither factor was present. Since the 
subject did not know from the onset to which group he belonged, 
the first card would not help him muoh. 
In the total feedback oondition, the subject only knew that 
some parts of the oonoept were present, he did. not know what 
they were. For instanoe, when the first card was a "Yes" card, 
-£1-
he knew onlY' tha.t the "If" factor and the "Then" factor were 
present. He did not know what they were. He could onlY' find 
this out bY' comparing the first card with other oard.s. In this 
process, he would have to rely large17 on feedback information. 
The rirat card in the total feedback condition was a 
"Does-not-contradict" card when the "If" factor was absent and 
the "Then tt factor present, or when both factors were absent. In 
the total condition also, the subject oould 0017 find out what 
the actual factors were bY' comparing the first oard with other 
oards. Again, he would have to rely largelY' on teedback informat-
ion. The oontent of the information on first card was amb1guous. 
This ambiguity could onlY' be eliminated by uti11zing feedbaok 
information. Since previous researoh (Bruner, Goodnow, and 
Austin, 1956; Haygood and Bourne, 1965) indicates that the 
subject learns the rule as he procedes in solving the problem, 
the information on the first card seems too tenuous for him to 
grasp at the beginning of the searoh for the solution. We might 
conolude that the subjeot would not pay olose attention to the 
information on the first card. 
The analY'sis of variance for time to solution lends some 
support to this viewpoint. SignificantlY' les8 time ht < .01) 
to solution was required in the total than in the partial feed-
baok oondition. The foous of the subjeot, in terms of time 
oonsumed, was on feedback information. In terms of time oonsumed 
on first oard, the differenoe between partial and total feedbaok 
conditions only approaohed, but did not reaoh significance at 
the .05 level. In the present experiment, the subject did not 
seem to have focused on the first card. 
There was a practice effect in terms of time to solution 
over three problems, but not in terms of number of card choices. 
The subjeot did not make signifioantly fewer card choioes over 
the three problems, but he made his choices in less time. 
Duncan Multiple Range Teats showed that problem one took signif-
icantly more time than problem three, though the differences 
between problems one and two, and two and three were not signif-
icant. A gradual progress from the first to the third problem 
appeared in terms of time only. This effect points to the fact 
that the problems or the task itself grew easier after the first 
problem. If so, this result is in acoord with the previous 
stUdies of Haygood and Bourne (1965) and Jacobson (1961). 
Two suggestions tor future research could be made from the 
present experiment in regard to information on first card. First, 
a clearer delineation of the kind of information on the first 
card could be made. The subject could be told the value of one 
of the faotors of the solution, for instance, or which of the 
factors was present or absent on the first card. Seoondly, a 
"No" card or negative instance of the rule could be used as a 
first card. Previous research (Freibergs 9.nd Tulving, 1961; 
Neisser and Ween., 1962; Conant and Trabasso, 1964) indicates 
that a negative instance of the ooncept is more helpful in 
solving disjunctive problems such as the conditional, than a 
positive insta.nce. Suoh a olear point of referenoe as a first 
card might make a significant difference both in terms of number 
of card choices and time to solution as regards future research 
with the conditional concept. 
OHAPTER V 
STJMMARY 
In order to assess the effect of information on the fov.mat-
ion of the oonditional ooncept, the performanoe of 78 Major 
Seminarians was investigated in three conditional concept 
attainment problems. A 2 X 3 X 2 repeated measures factorial 
design was used with the following two information conditions: 
total and partial feedbaok, and amount of information on first 
oard (Yes-Yes; No-Yes; No-No). There were significantly fewer 
oard choices (~<.Ol) in the total than in the partial feedbaok 
information condition, even though amount of inro~ation on the 
first card made no significant difference in number in number of 
card choices. The analysis of variance for the time factor 
paralleled these results except that the time faotor in regard 
to information on the first card approached significanoe. There 
was a significant difference in terms of time per problem (£~Ol) 
but no effect for number of card choices. Gradual progress was 
noted over the three problems not in terms of number of card 
choioes, but in terms of time. In regard to .t'ir~t oard '.nfomatiol, 
two suggestions were made for future reses.rch: First, a olearer 
delineation of the type of jnformatlon on the first card; Seoond, 
use of a negative instance of the rule as a first oard. 
- :;>.J. -
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